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1wage premium? I develop and calibrate an overlapping generations model
with discrete schooling choice. I ￿nd that changes in the life-cycle earnings
di⁄erential can explain the increase in female college enrollment rate very well.
Young women￿ s changing expectations of future employment opportunity also
played an important role in driving their college attendance decision from the
mid 1950s to the early 1970s.
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1 Introduction
In 2001, 56.3% of college students were women; men accounted for only 43.7% of
higher education enrollments (National Center for Educational Statistics, Digest of
Education Statistics 2003, Table 174). Five decades ago, the pattern was exactly the
opposite. In 1955, this ￿gure was around 65.3% for men and 34.7% for women. The
major reason behind this dramatic reversal of the gender gap in college enrollment
is the increasing college enrollment rate of women over the past ￿ve decades. As
shown in Figure 1, the female college enrollment rate of recent high school graduates
(individuals age 16 to 24 who graduated from high school or completed a GED
during the preceding 12 months) was only 34.6% in 1955 (male counterpart was






















Figure 1: Female college enrollment rate of recent high school completers
59.1%, 24.5% higher than females!) However, the female college enrollment rate has
been increasing since then. In 1980, this rate increased to 51.8%, and it was 5.1%
higher than the rate for males. In 2002, 68.4% of female high school graduates went
to college, while only 62.1% of male high school graduates did so.1
1College enrollment rates for the 1960-2002 period are taken from the National Center for Ed-
ucational Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 2003, Table 186. The data for 1955-1959 were
calculated by the author. See He (2009) Appendix A for the data construction.
3Why have girls gone to college more than boys? What is the driving force behind
the rising female college enrollment rate? Several empirical studies have documented
the stylized facts mentioned above and attempted to give an answer. Among them,
Averett and Burton (1996) try to link the gender di⁄erences in college attendance to
the gender di⁄erences in the college wage premium. They use a human capital model
to examine gender di⁄erences in the college attendance decision, positing that this
decision is a function of family background characteristics and the expected future
earnings di⁄erential between college and high school graduates. Using the NLSY79
data set, they study how one cohort (those ages 14 to 21 in 1979) has responded
to the jump in the college wage premium after 1980. For men, they ￿nd that the
e⁄ect of the college wage premium is positive and statistically signi￿cant, while for
women, it is much smaller and statistically insigni￿cant. Therefore, they conclude
that, for women, the college wage premium is not nearly as important to the decision
to attend college as it is for men. But they focus only on one cohort, and the future
earnings cover a short time horizon. More speci￿cally, they include only people who
were interviewed subsequently in 1981 and 1991, which means the oldest age in the
data set is 33; so at best, people can predict their future wage only up to age 33.
Therefore, as they claim in the paper, ￿...we cannot interpret our results as re￿ ecting
the impact of life-cycle earnings on education choice.￿
4Jacob (2002) uses the National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS) 1988
data set to study why women have higher college attendance rates than men. He
focuses on two explanations: the college wage premium which is proxied by the
earnings di⁄erential of 25- to 34-year-old full-time workers; and non-cognitive skills,
which are measured by middle school grades and the number of hours spent on
homework per week in eighth grade, a composite measure of disciplinary incidents,
and an indicator of whether the child had ever been left back during elementary
school. Using the Oaxaca decomposition method, Jacob shows that higher returns
to college education and the greater non-cognitive skills among women account for
nearly 90 percent of the gap. But due to the limitation of data availability, his
research still focuses on cross-sectional patterns, hence cannot examine the time
trend of the college enrollment rate.
Anderson (2002), however, tries to answer the same question by looking at dif-
ferent cohorts over time. Using the CPS data set, she constructs ￿ve cohorts who
were born during 1953-1957, 1958-1962, 1963-1967, 1968-1972, and 1973-1977. She
looks at male-female di⁄erences both within and across cohorts for 20 year olds. She
also employs the standard Oaxaca method to decompose within and across cohort
enrollment. She ￿nds an important component of the increase in female enrollment
is the behavior of older women, who enrolled less frequently than males when young,
5but who later make up for this lack of higher education. Other important factors
are that males have higher dropout rates in high school and are more likely to be in
prison or the military and social changes in the form of women delaying marriage for
careers.
Charles and Luoh (2003) argue that the reason why the standard approach with
its focus on the college wage premium cannot explain very well the pattern of male
and female schooling outcomes is that it misses an important aspect of the educa-
tional decision, namely the uncertainty of two investment options. Inheriting the
idea from Altonji (1993), they claim that risk-averse students also care about the
riskiness of these di⁄erent options when choosing between them. In other words, in
an extended human capital investment model, not only the expected earnings dif-
ferential but also the anticipated dispersion of future earnings determine people￿ s
educational investment decisions. Using the CPS data, Charles and Luoh show that,
over time, these anticipated future dispersions have evolved very di⁄erently for men
and women. For women, the dispersion of future college earnings decreased over the
past three decades; it is the opposite for men. Therefore, this trend would encourage
women to go to college.
Di⁄ering from all the works mentioned above, this paper develops and calibrates
an overlapping generations model with endogenous discrete schooling choice to ex-
6plain what drives the female college enrollment rate for the 1955-1980 period. It is
well known that the Korean and Vietnam wars (through the GI Bill and the military
draft) had a signi￿cant impact on male college attendance during this period (Bound
and Turner 2002: Card and Lemieux 2001). That is the reason why this paper fo-
cuses only on female college-entry decisions. Speci￿cally, this paper asks a question:
to what extent can the changes in the female college enrollment rate be explained by
the changes in the female cohort-speci￿c life-cycle college wage premium? In this
sense, my work is quite close to the original idea proposed in Averett and Burton
(1996), but deeper in two aspects. First, my model is a full-blown life-cycle model:
women enter into the model at age 18 and face the choice go to college or not. Af-
ter completing their education, they work until age 65. Within this framework, we
can analyze the e⁄ect of life-cycle earnings on educational choice. Second, Averett
and Burton (1996) analyze the impact of the college wage premium on college-entry
decision for only one cohort, while this paper examines the time trend of the college
enrollment rate. Di⁄erent from Charles and Luoh (2003), this paper sticks to the
standard human capital investment approach. Instead of focusing on the e⁄ect of
a second-order (e.g., dispersion) dimension of future earnings on education choice,
this paper examines the e⁄ect from the ￿rst-order dimension of future earnings on
college enrollment behavior within a standard life-cycle framework.
7The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
model of the college attendance decision and lays out the theoretical foundation for
the later data analysis and calibration exercise. Section 3 describes the data and
analyzes some ￿ndings from the data. Section 4 presents the quantitative results of
the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, I present the economic model that will be used later for calibra-
tion. The framework is similar to the one used in He (2009). It is a discrete time
overlapping generations (OLG) model. Individuals make the schooling choice in the
￿rst period. There is only one good in the economy, which can be used either for
consumption or for investment. There is no uncertainty in the model. Individuals
have perfect foresight.
2.1 Demographics
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of ￿nite-lived women with
total measure one. Women enter into the economy (or are ￿born￿ ) with zero initial
assets when they are age 18, which is the common age of high school graduates. I
call them the birth cohort and model age as j = 1. They then live and work up to
8age J. To distinguish between the age of a cohort and calendar time, I use j for age,
and t for calendar time.
2.2 Preferences











where cj;t+j￿1 is consumption for the age-j woman at time t + j ￿ 1. ￿ is the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. 1
￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Since leisure does not enter into the utility function, each women will supply all of
her labor endowment, which is normalized to be one.
2.3 Budget Constraints
A woman chooses go to college or not at the beginning of the ￿rst period. I use
s 2 fc;hg to indicate this choice. If an individual chooses s = h; she ends up with a
9high school diploma and goes on the job market to work as an unskilled laborer and
earns high school graduate wage sequence fwh
jgJ
j=1. Or she can choose s = c; spend
the ￿rst four years in college as a full-time student, and pay the tuition. I assume
that she can always successfully graduate from college (there is no some college or
college dropout in the model). After that, she goes on the labor market to ￿nd a
job as a skilled worker and earns college graduate wage sequence fwc
jgJ
j=1. I assume
there is no unemployment.
For s = c; the budget constraints of an individual born at time t are
cj;t+j￿1 + tuitiont+j￿1 + aj;t+j￿1 ￿ (1 + rt+j￿1)aj￿1;t+j￿2 8j = 1;2;3;4 (2)
cj;t+j￿1 + aj;t+j￿1 ￿ (1 + rt+j￿1)aj￿1;t+j￿2 + w
c
j;t+j￿1 8j = 5;:::;J
cj;t+j￿1 ￿ 0;a0;t￿1 = 0;aJ;t+J￿1 ￿ 0:
In the ￿rst four periods, she pays tuition tuitiont+j￿1, consumes cj;t+j￿1, and saves
aj;t+j￿1. After graduation, she earns wage wc
j;t+j￿1 at age j and consumes and saves
subject to what she earns and accumulates. Notice that there is no borrowing con-
straint in this economy. Since they do not have any initial assets, college students
need to borrow money for consumption and pay tuition during the ￿rst four periods,
and they pay back the loans later.
10For s = h; the budget constraints of an individual born at time t are
cj;t+j￿1 + aj;t+j￿1 ￿ (1 + rt+j￿1)aj￿1;t+j￿2 + w
h
j;t+j￿1 8j = 1;:::;J (3)
cj;t+j￿1 ￿ 0;a0;t￿1 = 0;aJ;t+J￿1 ￿ 0:
2.4 Schooling Choice
I assume that di⁄erent individuals within the birth cohort are endowed with di⁄erent
levels of ability. And ability a⁄ects only individuals￿disutility cost of schooling. I
assume that the disutility cost of schooling is a strictly decreasing function of ability.
Higher ability implies lower disutility cost.
Individuals are indexed by their ability level i 2 [0;1]. The CDF of ability
distribution is denoted by F, F(i0) = Pr(i ￿ i0): DIS(i) represents the ability-
related disutility cost for individual i. Notice that DIS(i) ￿ 0 and DIS0(i) < 0. An










1 if si = c
0 if si = h
:
11She maximizes her life-time utility subject to the budget constraints (2) or (3) con-
ditional on her educational choice. If an individual chooses to go to college, she
has to bear the idiosyncratic disutility cost. Notice that the disutility cost DIS(i)
does not enter into the budget constraint; therefore, everyone with same educational
achievement from the same birth cohort has the same life-time utility derived from
physical consumption. I use UTILc to denote the discounted life-time utility for
college graduates; UTILh denotes the discounted life-time utility derived from phys-
ical consumption for high school graduates. UTILc ￿ UTILh represents the utility
gain from attending college. Obviously, individual i will choose to go to college
if DIS(i) < [UTILc ￿ UTILh]; not to go if DIS(i) > [UTILc ￿ UTILh], and is
indi⁄erent if DIS(i) = [UTILc ￿ UTILh].




















Here NPV stands for the net present value of higher education. Since wc
j;t+j￿1 =
0;8j = 1;:::4, students never work when they stay in college, and I can further




















The ￿rst term represents the bene￿ts of schooling: college graduates can earn more
through the earnings di⁄erential. The second term represents the opportunity cost of
schooling: it is the present value of four years of forgone wages for college students.
The third term is the present value of tuition paid during the college years, which
represents the direct cost of schooling. From this representation it is very clear






j=1 is going to a⁄ect
people￿ s schooling decision. Other things being equal, an increase in the life-time
college wage premium raises the bene￿ts of schooling, hence NPV . Higher NPV
induces a higher utility gain from schooling UTILc
t ￿ UTILh
t. Given the stationary
distribution of the disutility cost, a higher utility gain from schooling means more
likely DIS(i) < [UTILc ￿ UTILh], which implies a higher enrollment rate.
The basic intuition of this model can also be seen from Figure 2. In this ￿gure,
the x-axis measures ability i. Women are ranked from zero to one by their ability.
The disutility cost DIS(i) is a decreasing function of the ability index i. V D rep-
resents utility gain from attending college UTILc ￿ UTILh. The cut-o⁄ ability (or





Therefore, women with ability i < i￿ will choose not to go to college, while women
with i > i￿ will choose to go. The enrollment rate thus is equal to the probability
when i > i￿. If the college wage premium increases over the life-cycle, so does the
NPV ; therefore, the utility gain V D increases to V D0, and this will decrease the
cut-o⁄ point to i￿0. Since Pr(i > i￿0) > Pr(i > i￿); more women go to college. A
higher life-cycle earnings di⁄erential thus encourages college attendance.
2.5 Dynamic Programming Representation
For purpose of computation, it is easier to write an individual￿ s schooling decision
problem in terms of dynamic programming language. Let V c
t+j￿1(aj￿1;t+j￿2;j) denote
the value function of an age-j woman with asset holding aj￿1;t+j￿2 at beginning of








t+j(aj;t+j￿1;j + 1)g (6)
14Figure 2: The determination of college enrollment rate
15subject to the budget constraint (2).








t+j(aj;t+j￿1;j + 1)g (7)
subject to budget constraint (3).
Individuals solve their perfect foresight dynamic problem by using backward in-
duction. Back to age 1 at time t, a woman with ability index i will make her schooling
decision si;t based on the criteria below
si;t = c if V
c
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) ￿ DIS(i) > V
h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1);
si;t = h if V
c
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) ￿ DIS(i) < V
h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1); (8)
si;t = indi⁄erent if V
c
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) ￿ DIS(i) = V
h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1):
3 Data
I use the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1962 to 2003 to construct
the data counterparts in the model. I choose the sample restrictions to follow those
used in Eckstein and NagypÆl (2004) except I further restrict the data to include only
16high school graduates (HSG hereafter) between age 18 and 65 and college graduates
(CG) between age 22 to 65 in the sample. As in their paper, I restrict my attention
to full-time full-year (FTFY) workers. The wage here is the annualized wage and
salary earnings. I use the personal consumption expenditure de￿ ator from NIPA to
convert all wages in terms of constant 2002 dollars.
3.1 Cohort-Speci￿c Wage Premium
In the model, women in di⁄erent cohorts make the educational decision based on the
expected earnings di⁄erential speci￿c to their cohort. The perfect foresight assump-
tion allows me to use actual observed future earnings in the CPS as the measure
of expected future earnings. Since the CPS is a repeated cross-sectional data set, I
use a so-called ￿pesudo-cohort construction method￿to construct the cohort-speci￿c
expected wage pro￿les.2 For example, the 1962 cohort￿ s (18-year-old HSG in 1962)
life-time (18-65 years old) female HSG wage pro￿le fwh
j;1961+jg48
j=1 is constructed as
follows: I take 18-year-old female HSGs in 1962, calculate their mean wage, then
19-year-old female HSGs in 1963, calculate the mean wage, then 20-year-old female
HSGs in 1964, 21-year-old female HSGs in 1965, and so on, until I reach 58-year-old
2It is a pesudo-cohort because the CPS is not a panel data set. It does not track people over
life-times. Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2003) use a similar method to estimate the cohort-based
return to schooling.
17female HSGs in 2002, which is the end year of my CPS data set.
I use a similar approach to construct the 1962 cohort￿ s female CG wage pro￿le
fwc
j;1961+jg48
j=1. But I start from 1966 because if someone from the 1962 cohort chooses
to go to college, she needs to spend four years in college. She graduates in 1966 and
starts to earn CG wages from that year. Therefore, I take 22-year-old female CGs
in 1966, calculate their mean wage, then calculate the mean wage for 23-year-old
female CGs in 1967, and so on.
Figure 3 shows the life-cycle wage pro￿les for six cohorts. They are the 1955,
1960, 1965, 1970, 1975 and 1980 cohorts. For each cohort, the wage pro￿le of CGs is
signi￿cantly higher than that of HSGs. Two facts about the life-cycle wage pro￿les
need to be mentioned here: (1) Earnings rise with age, but at a decreasing rate;
(2) Earnings increase faster for more educated workers, which implies CGs have a
steeper hump-shaped (or increasing but concave) wage pro￿le than that of HSGs.
Notice that for the 1955 and 1960 cohorts, the late-age earnings for CGs become
quite noisy. This is due to the smaller sample size for CGs at the later age.






j=1 exhibits some interest-
ing patterns for these cohorts. Due to data availability, I calculate the wage premium
only from age 22 to age 40. The average college wage premium from age 22 to age
40 for the 1955 cohort was 1.45. For the 1960 cohort, it was 1.48. It then decreased



























































































































Figure 3: Life-cycle wage pro￿les for six cohorts
19signi￿cantly to 1.38 for the 1965 cohort and 1.39 for the 1970 cohort. For these
two cohorts, the compressed college wage premium in the 1970s signi￿cantly reduced
their earnings di⁄erential at their prime age when the CG wage pro￿le is in a stage of
steep ascent. In contrast, the rising college wage premium starting from 1980 helped
to increase the average college wage premium from age 22 to age 40 for the 1975 and
1980 cohorts to 1.56 and 1.63, respectively.
3.2 Missing Data
Following the pesudo-cohort construction method, I am able to construct life-cycle
wage pro￿les for HSGs and CGs from the 1955 to the 1980 cohort. However, due
to the time range of the CPS data, I do not have a complete life-cycle wage pro￿le
for any cohort. For example, some cohorts miss the later age data points (cohorts
after 1961), and some miss the early age data points (cohorts between 1955 and
1960). I use the econometric method to predict the mean wage at that speci￿c age
to extrapolate the missing data. I predict them by either second- or third-order





















20The criterion of selection basically is the goodness of ￿t. I also check with the
neighboring cohorts to make sure the predicted value is reasonable and consistent.
The ￿rule of thumb￿of hump-shaped pro￿le applies here too. For example, if an
estimation gives me an exponential trend of the life-cycle wage pro￿le, I cannot
accept it. This exercise ends up that for most of the cohorts I use a second-order
polynomial method to extrapolate (essentially it is similar to the Mincer equation).
My extrapolation stops after the 1980 cohort because after this cohort, a lack of data
points creates trouble; hence, I do not have a reliable prediction.3 By ￿lling in the
missing data, eventually I obtain complete cohort-speci￿c life-cycle wage pro￿les for
HSGs and CGs from the 1955 to the 1980 cohort. Cohorts in the 1950s have the
best data quality because they have the fewest missing data points.
These cohort-speci￿c life-cycle wage pro￿les provide the information needed in
the ￿rst two terms of equation (5). To fully understand the higher education choice
over time, I also need information about tuition, which is the direct cost of college
education as in the third term of equation (5). In Figure 4 I report the real tuition,
fees, room and board (TFRB) per student charged by an average four-year institution
in terms of constant 2002 dollars.4 TFRB increased over time except in the 1970s,
3The 1980 cohort has life-cycle wage pro￿les only up to age 40 from the CPS data. Heckman,
Lochner, and Todd (2003) also notice this problem and stop in 1983 for their cohort-based estimates.
4See He (2009) for the explanation to construct this data sequence.
























Figure 4: Real tuition, fees, room and board charge per student
when it became stable. Starting from 1980, real TFRB raised dramatically. Di⁄erent
cohorts face di⁄erent TFRB charges based on the years during which they attended
college.
224 Results
In this section, the economic model in Section 2 is calibrated to generate the female
college enrollment rates. The calibration strategy I employ here is to adopt the
common values widely used in the literature for the preference parameters. For
the model-speci￿c disutility parameter b (see equation (9) below), I calibrate it to
match the enrollment rate data of the initial cohort (HSGs in 1955). Under these
calibrated parameter values, I then input the data of cohort-speci￿c life-cycle wage
pro￿les and real TFRB in Section 3 into the model. Given that I have enough
information about individuals￿budget constraints, I am able to solve their dynamic
programming problem as in (6) and (7). Finally, I use the criterion in (8) to determine
the enrollment rate in di⁄erent years.
4.1 Calibration
The value of discount factor ￿ is taken to be 0.99, which is quite close to the one used
in Auerbach and Kotliko⁄ (1987) for a representative agent, life cycle model with
certain lifetimes (they use 0.9852). The value of CRRA coe¢ cient ￿ is 2, which is
taken from • Imrohoro… glu, • Imrohoro… glu, and Joines (1995), and it is also widely used
in the life-cycle literature. The interest rate r is set to 4%.
For simplicity and for purposes of calibration, I assume the ability level i is






I assume that this cost function is also time invariant. For the lowest ability indi-
vidual (i = 0), DIS(i) = 1, so she will never go to college. On the other hand, for
the highest ability individual (i = 1), DIS(i) = 0. Since the present value of the
life-cycle wage pro￿le of CGs is higher than that of HSGs (see Figure 3), she will
certainly choose to go to college. Given this functional form, as is shown in Section







t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) ￿ V
h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1):
Since ability level is uniformly distributed and DIS0(i) < 0, the enrollment rate at
time t is equal to Pr(i > i￿
t) = 1 ￿ F(i￿
t) = 1 ￿ i￿
t.
I calibrate the scale factor of disutility cost function b to match the female college
enrollment rate data in 1955, which is 34.6%. This ends up with b = 7:15.
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used in the model.
24Parameters Description Value
￿ discount factor 0.99
￿ CRRA coe¢ cient 2
b scale factor of disutility cost function 7.15
r real interest rate 4%
Table 1: Parameter values of the model
4.2 Findings
Based on the parameter values shown in Table 1, at year t I solve the birth cohort￿ s
dynamic problem using a standard numerical method to obtain the di⁄erence in value
function V Dt = V c
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1) ￿ V h
t (a0;t￿1 = 0;1). This di⁄erence determines a
unique threshold level i￿
t and hence the corresponding college enrollment rate at year
t (et)
et = Pr(i > i
￿
t) = 1 ￿ i
￿
t.
Figure 5 compares the female college enrollment rates from the model with those
in the data from 1955 to 1980. The model replicates the rising trend of college
enrollment rates for females very well. In the data, the enrollment rate increased
from 34.6% in 1955 to 51.8% in 1980; while in the model, it increased from 34.6% to
52.0%.
Looking at a detailed comparison, from 1955 to 1960, the model predicts that
the enrollment rate increased from 34.6% to 39.2%; while in the data it increased
from 34.6% to 38.0%. The model actually overshoots the data for this period. It





















Figure 5: Female college enrollment rate: model vs. data
26implies that some factor other than the life-cycle earnings di⁄erential was deterring
women from going to college in that period. From 1960 to 1966, the prediction
from the model is quite in line with the data. However, from 1967 to 1972, the
model signi￿cantly underpredicts the college enrollment rate for females. In 1967,
the enrollment rate was 47.2% in the data, while the model predicts a rate of only
40.6%, which was 6.6% lower than the data. Similarly, in 1970, the college enrollment
rate was 48.5% in the data, while it was 43.3% in the model.
One possible reason for the underprediction of the female college enrollment rate
in the model during that period is that the model does not capture the changing
social norms and expectations about the role of work among young women in the
late 1960s and early 1970s. As evidence of this changing social norm, Astin, Oseguera,
Sax, and Korn (2002) report the results of the Astin Freshman Survey, which is a
national sample of college freshmen, the vast majority of whom were 18 years old.
In the survey, the freshmen agreed or disagreed with the statement: ￿The activities
of married women are best con￿ned to the home and family.￿The fraction of female
freshmen disagreeing with this statement increases dramatically from 59% in 1967
to 83% in 1973. The fraction, however, has been quite stable since then.
Rising expectations of future employment certainly encouraged girls to go to col-
lege. Based on the observation from the Astin Freshmen Survey and their own data,
27Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko (2006) estimate that the change in expectations about
future labor participation would account for a 4.8 to a 5.7 percentage point increase
in the female college graduation rate from 1968 to 1979. The college enrollment rate
in the current model from 1967 to 1972 on average is below that in the data by 5
percentage points. Since in the model the college enrollment rate is equal to the
college completion rate, changes in expectations among young women could capture
the entire di⁄erence between the model￿ s prediction and the data.
Based on this conclusion, a reasonable conjecture as to why the model overpre-
dicts the female college enrollment rate from 1955 to 1960 is that teenage girls at
that time did not see much chance for female employment and they were still quite
attached to the family. Just as new social norms ten years later led to a rise in college
attendance, the traditional social norms of earlier years deterred those women from
going to college. And the e⁄ect of social norms is what is missing in the model.
Since 1972, the model has done a very good job of replicating the data. In the
data, the female college enrollment rate increased from 46.0% in 1972 to 51.8% in
1980. The model counterpart was from 46.5% to 52%. Girls who graduated from
high school around that time had already witnessed a drastic increase in the female
labor force participation rate and formed their expectations accordingly; therefore,
it is not surprising to see that the decision to go to college is entirely driven by
28economic concerns. The higher college wage premium for females since 1980 has
raised the bene￿ts of attending college as shown in the ￿rst term of equation (5). It
was a signi￿cant factor in encouraging girls to go to college.
To summarize, the results show that the human capital investment model works
quite well to capture the rising female college enrollment rate from 1955 to 1980. The
results also suggest that the changing expectations of future employment opportunity
among young women may play an important role in driving this enrollment rate from
the mid 1950s to the early 1970s.
4.3 Counterfactual Experiments
In the model, the college attendance decision is based on the exogenous life-cycle
earnings di⁄erential and tuition cost. To check whether the results depend on factors
other than life-cycle earnings di⁄erential, I run the following counterfactual experi-
ments. For each experiment, I keep the parameter values unchanged except that I
recalibrate the scale factor of the disutility cost function b to match the enrollment
rate in 1955 if need be.
294.3.1 Fix tuition cost
In order to quantify the e⁄ects of changing tuition costs over the target period, I ￿x
tuition costs at the level of the 1955 cohort. Therefore, the 1956-1980 cohorts face the
same tuition cost as the 1955 cohort. Figure 6 shows the results. Compared to the
benchmark case, when the tuition cost is ￿xed at level for the 1955 cohort, the female
college enrollment rate increases only very slightly over the period. Therefore, the
direct cost of schooling apparently is not a signi￿cant factor in determining women￿ s
college entrance behavior.
4.3.2 Shorter time horizon
In the benchmark model, women have perfect foresight about their life-cycle wage
pro￿les. To check the importance of the life-cycle (ages 18 to 65) feature in shaping
the results, I reduce the time horizon of each cohort from 48 periods (ages 18-65)
to only 23 periods (ages 18-40). Therefore, I do not need to deal with missing data
after age 40 for all the cohorts from 1955 to 1980. Given the change in life-cycle
wage pro￿les, scale factor b is recalibrated to match the college enrollment rate in
1955.5
5The new value is b = 2:27. A shorter time horizon reduces the value of life-cycle earning
di⁄erentials as in the ￿rst term of equation (5). The disutility cost has to be lower in order to
match the enrollment rate in 1955.






















Figure 6: No change in tuition cost


























Figure 7: Shorter time horizon
The results are shown in Figure 7. For most of the period 1955-1980, the model
with shorter time horizons generates a signi￿cantly lower college enrollment rate,
which is a complete divergence from the data. As individuals face shorter time
horizons, the discounted present value of the life-cycle earnings di⁄erential (￿rst
term in equation 5) decreases. Lower bene￿ts of college education thus discourage
college attendance.
32This experiment might help us to understand why Averett and Burton (1996)
concluded that the e⁄ect of the college wage premium is very small and statistically
insigni￿cant for women. Given that in their work women can forecast their wage
only up to age 33, it is not surprising to see that the human capital model they use
shows a much smaller e⁄ect of the college wage premium on the college enrollment
rate than the full-blown life-cycle model used in this paper.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a discrete time overlapping generations model with an endoge-
nous college-entry decision. The decision is based on the cost-bene￿t analysis implied
by the standard human capital investment theory. Two key features are exogenous
choice-dependent life-cycle wage pro￿les and an idiosyncratic disutility cost of a col-
lege education. Using this model, I quantitatively examine the driving force behind
the dramatic increase in the female college enrollment rate from 1955 to 1980. I ￿nd
that the model works quite well in capturing the rising female college enrollment rate
during this period. The rising college wage premium is the major driving force. The
results also suggest that the change in expectations of future employment opportu-
nity among young women may play an important role in driving the enrollment rate
from the mid 1950s to the early 1970s.
33Recent literature shows that the marriage market may also be an important
determinant in women￿ s schooling decision. And education might also a⁄ect women￿ s
fertility and marriage decision. This paper does not address these issues. However,
it would be an interesting extension to include endogenous marriage and fertility
choice in the current model to analyze the interaction among these choices. This
extended model surely will provide a platform for understanding not only the changes
in women￿ s college-entry decisions, but also the evolution of the marriage rate and
fertility decisions over time. I leave that for future research.
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